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Ribbentrop: Guilty as Charged 
Sean Colvin Joachim	  von	  Ribbentrop	  was	  the	  German	  Foreign	  Minister	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  He	  publically	  denied	  his	  complicity	   in	   the	  Holocaust	  during	   the	  Nuremberg	  Trials	  of	  1945,	  claiming	  that	  he	  merely	  deferred	  to	  Hitler’s	  wishes,	  and	  did	  not	  play	  a	  signiHicant	  role	  in	   the	   initiation	   of	   the	   war	   that	   ultimately	   allowed	   for	   the	   Holocaust.	   Much	   historical	  research	  indicates	  otherwise.	  Ribbentrop	  did	  in	  fact	  play	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Nazi	   party,	   conspired	   to	   wage	   wars	   of	   aggression,	   and,	   most	   importantly,	   in	   his	   role	   as	  Foreign	  Minister,	  actively	  participated	  in	  the	  planning	  and	  administration	  of	  the	  Nazi	  Final	  Solution.	   His	   participation	   included	   the	   conHiscation	   of	   Jewish	   property,	   the	   spreading	   of	  anti-­‐Semitic	  policy	  abroad,	  and	  lastly,	  the	  mass	  deportation	  and	  murder	  of	  millions	  of	  Jews	  across	  Europe.	  	  Joachim	   von	   Ribbentrop	   joined	   the	   National	   Socialist	   (Nazi)	   Party	   in	   1932	   after	  becoming	   mesmerized	   by	   one	   of	   Hitler’s	   speeches.	   Ribbentrop	   quickly	   developed	   a	  personal	   relationship	   with	   Hitler,	   which	   included	   Hitler	   visiting	   the	   Ribbentrop	   villa	  numerous	   times	   for	  dinner. 	   It	  was	  during	   the	  summer	  of	  1932	   that	  Ribbentrop	  played	  a	  1signiHicant	  role	  in	  the	  Nazi	  acquisition	  of	  power.	  His	  role	  involved	  providing	  his	  villa	  as	  the	  staging	   ground	   for	   several	   meetings	   between	   Hitler	   and	   Franz	   von	   Papen.	   The	   primary	  focus	  of	  these	  meetings	  was	  to	  seize	  the	  German	  chancellorship	  from	  Kurt	  von	  Schleicher,	  and	  to	  secure	  Nazi	  control	  of	  the	  Reichstag. 	  In	  his	  1935	  Wer	  Ist’s	  (Who’s	  Who)	  biographical	  2sketch,	   Ribbentrop	   boasts	   that,	   through	   his	   intermediation,	   the	   Hitler	   government	   was	  formed,	  and,	  further,	  that	  the	  decisive	  meetings	  which	  perpetuated	  the	  Nazi	  rise	  to	  power	  occurred	  at	  his	  personal	  home. 	  By	  30	   January	  1933,	   the	  Nazis	  had	  secured	  power	   in	   the	  3Reich,	  and	  Ribbentrop	  had	  simultaneously	  acquired	  an	  inordinate	  amount	  of	   inHluence	  on	  Hitler,	   which,	   by	   1938,	   would	   culminate	   in	   his	   appointment	   as	   the	   Foreign	   Minister	   of	  Germany.	  	  Ribbentrop	   became	   a	   member	   of	   the	   Reichstag	   in	   1933,	   at	   which	   point	   he	   held	  various	  positions	  within	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  such	  as	  foreign	  policy	  advisor	  to	  the	  Führer	  and	  representative	  of	  the	  Nazi	  Party	  on	  foreign	  policy.	   	  Near	  the	  end	  of	  1933,	  Ribbentrop	  was	   put	   in	   charge	   of	   his	   own	   department	  within	   the	   foreign	   ofHice,	   known	   as	   the	   “Büro	  Ribbentrop.” 	  This	  Büro	  did	  not	  replace	  the	  Foreign	  OfHice,	  but	  instead	  carried	  out	  speciHic	  4tasks	  that	  the	  Foreign	  OfHice	  was	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  perform.	  Through	  non-­‐traditional	  methods	   such	  as	  bribing	   journalists	   and	  paying	   informants,	   the	  Büro	  effectively	   acquired	  political	  intelligence	  that	  was	  relayed	  to	  the	  Führer	  personally. 	  It	  was	  in	  this	  capacity	  that	  5Ribbentrop	   truly	   developed	   his	   inHluence	   over	  Hitler	   in	   regards	   to	   foreign	   affairs,	   and	   in	  1938	  Ribbentrop	  became	  the	  Foreign	  Minister	  of	  Germany.	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Ribbentrop	  directly	  conspired	  with	  Hitler	  to	  wage	  wars	  of	  aggression	  in	  his	  role	  as	  Foreign	  Minister,	  which	  ultimately	  contributed	  heavily	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	   He	   assured	   Hitler	   that	   Britain	   and	   France	   would	   not	   follow	   through	   on	   their	  guarantees	   of	   protection	   for	   Poland	   if	   Germany	  were	   to	   invade.	  He	   based	   his	   unfounded	  counsel	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   neither	   country	   had	   declared	  war	   on	  Germany	   after	   the	  Munich	  Agreement,	  in	  which	  Hitler	  had	  reneged	  on	  a	  previous	  commitment	  not	  to	  engage	  in	  further	  acts	  of	  aggression	  against	  Czechoslovakia. 	  Both	  Ribbentrop	  and	  Hitler,	  however,	  had	  been	  6given	   advice	   to	   the	   contrary	   by	   Dr.	   Albrecht	   Haushofer,	   who	   worked	   part	   time	   for	  Ribbentrop	   as	   an	   expert	   on	   British	   affairs.	   Haushofer	   had	   indicated	   that	   Anglo-­‐German	  relations	   were	   deteriorating	   and	   that	   the	   British	   would	   undoubtedly	   declare	   war	   if	  Germany	   attempted	   to	   expand	   into	   Poland	   through	  military	   conquest,	   and,	   furthermore,	  that	   the	   British	   war	   effort	   would	   be	   augmented	   by	   American	   support. 	   Unfortunately,	  7Ribbentrop’s	  inHluence	  over	  Hitler	  was	  too	  great	  by	  this	  time	  for	  the	  Führer	  to	  be	  swayed	  by	  a	   report	   that	   Ribbentrop	   described	   as	   “Secret	   Service	   Propaganda.” 	   By	   this	   point,	  8Ribbentrop’s	  inHluence	  over	  Hitler	  was	  so	  pronounced	  that	  the	  former	  German	  Ambassador,	  Ulrich	  von	  Hassell,	  noted	  that:	  “According	  to	  all	  reports	  Ribbentrop	  is	  the	  man	  who	  has	  the	  most	   inHluence	   with	   Hitler.” 	   Clearly,	   that	   inHluence	   speaks	   to	   Ribbentrop’s	   signiHicant	  9involvement	  in	  the	  start	  of	  the	  war.	  	  It	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  conclude	  that	  Ribbentrop	  did,	  in	  fact,	  believe	  that	  the	  British	  and	  French	   would	   not	   wage	   war	   on	   Germany,	   due	   to	   the	   Western	   powers’	   continued	  appeasement	   of	   German	   aggression	   and	   expansion;	   however,	   it	   is	   more	   probable	   that	  Ribbentrop	  wanted	  to	  carry	  favour	  with	  Hitler	  by	  demonstrating	  his	  shared	  desire	  for	  war.	  Ribbentrop’s	  lust	  for	  war	  also	  drew	  comments	  from	  another	  German	  diplomat,	  Kessel,	  and	  from	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Ernst	  von	  Weizsacker,	  who	  indicated	  that	  “the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  Hitler	  and	  Ribbentrop	  was	  directly	  aimed	  at	  war,”	  and,	  furthermore,	  that	  any	  attempt	  by	  the	  Poles	   to	  negotiate	  would	   fail	   as	   they	  would	  be	  deliberately	   “presented	  with	  unacceptable	  demands.” 	   Ribbentrop’s	   general	   disposition	   towards	   war	   as	   opposed	   to	   traditional	  10diplomacy	  is	  fully	  captured	  in	  a	  diary	  entry	  by	  the	  Italian	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Count	  Ciano,	  in	  which	  he	  describes	  asking	  Ribbentrop	  whether	  Germany	  wanted	  “the	  Corridor,	  or	  Danzig,”	  and	   Ribbentrop	   replied,	   “not	   anymore,	   we	   want	   war.” 	   Another	   entry	   in	   Count	   Ciano’s	  11diary	  late	   in	  1939	  illustrates	  Ribbentrop’s	  unwillingness	  to	  consider	  alternate	  approaches	  to	  achieving	  Lebensraum	  in	  the	  East:	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  The	  will	  to	  Hight	  is	  unalterable.	  He	  rejects	  any	  solution	  which	  might	  	  	  	  	  	  satisfy	  Germany	  and	  prevent	  the	  struggle.	  I	  am	  certain	  that	  even	  if	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  Germans	  were	  given	  everything	  they	  demanded,	  they	  would	  attack	  just	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  the	  same,	  because	  they	  are	  possessed	  by	  the	  demon	  of	  destruction.  12At	   this	   juncture,	   however,	  Germany	  was	  not	   yet	   diplomatically	   prepared	   to	   invade	  Poland,	   as	   the	   risk	   of	   having	   to	   Hight	   a	   two-­‐front	  war	  was	   extreme.	   The	  western	   powers	  continued	   to	   support	   Poland,	   the	   southern	   border	   could	   not	   be	   secured	   as	  Romania	   and	  Yugoslavia	  rejected	  the	  status	  of	  German	  satellites,	  and	  the	  Soviets	  had	  begun	  talks	  with	  the	  French	  and	  British,	  which	  left	  Germany	  vulnerable	  and	  without	  support. 	  Ribbentrop	  was	  13tasked	  with	  Hinding	  a	  diplomatic	  solution	  that	  would	  enable	  further	  expansion	  in	  the	  East. 	  14He	   put	   his	   efforts	   towards	   forming	   an	   alliance	   with	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   those	   efforts	  ultimately	  culminated	  in	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Nazi-­‐Soviet	  Non-­‐Aggression	  Pact	  on	  23	  August	  1939.	   The	   pact	   guaranteed	   peace	   with	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   granted	   various	   territorial	  concessions	   to	   the	  Soviets,	   thereby	  precluding	  a	  Soviet	  alliance	  with	   the	  western	  powers,	  and	  rendering	  the	  German	  concern	  about	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  two-­‐front	  war	  obsolete. 	  This	  15ultimately	  provided	  the	  Nazis	  with	  the	  assurance	  they	  needed	  to	  invade	  Poland. 	  This,	  they	  16did	   on	   1	   September	   1939,	   and	   two	   days	   later	   both	   Britain	   and	   France	   declared	   war	   on	  Germany.	   The	   Second	  World	  War	   had	   begun,	   and	   the	   stage	  was	   set	   for	   the	  Holocaust	   to	  unfold. 	  17After	   Ribbentrop’s	   appointment	   as	   Foreign	   Minister	   in	   1938	   he	   was	   tasked	   with	  creating	   the	   Referat	   Partei	   (“Special	   Party	   Section”),	   which	   he	   was	   to	   place	   under	   the	  leadership	   of	   his	   ruthless	   subordinate	   Martin	   Luther.	   This	   section	   was	   primarily	  responsible	   for	   communications	   between	   the	   Foreign	  OfHice	   and	   the	  Reich	  Main	   Security	  OfHice	   (RSHA),	  which	  was	   directed	   by	   the	   Commander	   of	   the	   Schutzstaffel	   (SS),	   Heinrich	  Himmler. 	  This	  is	  signiHicant	  because,	  in	  1939,	  Himmler’s	  RSHA	  would	  become	  the	  primary	  18control	  center	  of	  the	  Final	  Solution. 	  The	  Referat	  Partei	  increased	  in	  size	  and	  importance,	  19and,	  by	  1941,	  it	  was	  transformed	  into	  a	  division	  known	  as	  the	  Abteilung	  Deutschland,	  which	  remained	  under	  Luther’s	   control. 	   Luther,	   in	  his	   role	   as	   leader	  of	  Abteilung	  Deutschland,	  20was	   ultimately	   responsible	   for	   carrying	   out	   such	   reprehensible	   activities	   as	   negotiating	  with	  other	  nations	  for	  the	  deportation	  of	  Jews. 	  In	  1941,	  Himmler	  and	  Ribbentrop	  agreed	  21that	   the	   illegal	  activities	  of	   this	  party	  would	  be	  concealed	   from	  diplomatic	  mission	  chiefs,	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thereby	   indicating	   Ribbentrop’s	   complicity	   in	   the	   overall	   plan	   to	   address	   the	   Jewish	  question. 	  22Ribbentrop’s	   views	   about	   Jews	   and	   his	   approach	   to	   dealing	   with	   the	   “Jewish	  Question”	   are	   clearly	   illustrated	   in	   a	   memorandum	   produced	   by	   his	   ofHice	   entitled	   “The	  Jewish	  Question	  as	  a	   factor	   in	  German	  Foreign	  Policy	   in	   the	  Year	  1938.” 	   Implicit	   in	   that	  23memorandum	   was	   the	   notion	   that	   simply	   removing	   Jews	   from	   Germany	   would	   not	   be	  sufHicient. 	   The	   document	   addressed	   the	   strategy	   of	   dispersing	   all	   Jews	   from	   German	  24territory,	   which	   by	   that	   time	   included	   Austria. 	   The	   document	   argued	   that	   expulsion	   of	  25German	   Jews	   to	   other	   territories	  would	   add	   to	   anti-­‐Jewish	   sentiment	   in	   those	   countries,	  particularly	  if	  the	  immigrant	  Jews	  were	  impoverished,	  which	  would	  place	  a	  burden	  on	  the	  host	   countries.	   These	   actions	   were	   designed	   to	   promote	   an	   international	   solution	   that	  would	   allow	   for	   the	   expulsion	   of	   all	   Jews	   from	   Europe.	   Ribbentrop’s	   opposition	   to	   the	  formation	   of	   a	   Jewish	   State	   in	   Palestine	  was	   also	   evident,	   as	   he	   feared	   that	   such	   a	   state	  might	   inHluence	  world	   Jewry	  and	   international	   law	  and	  relations,	  much	   like	   the	   inHluence	  exerted	   by	   the	   Vatican. 	   In	   promoting	   anti-­‐Jewish	   sentiment	   other	   countries	   might	   be	  26more	  inclined	  to	  commit	  to	  the	  expulsion	  of	  their	  Jews.  	   Prior	   to	  1941,	  Nazi	  Germany’s	   solution	   to	   the	   “Jewish	  Problem”	  was	  one	  of	   forced	  emigration.	   This	   strategy	   was	   considered	   feasible	   even	   after	   the	   addition	   of	   Jews	   from	  Austria	  and	   the	  Sudetenland. 	  However,	  with	   the	  conquest	  of	  Poland,	  a	  massive	   inHlux	  of	  27Jews	  came	  under	  German	  control,	  and	  a	  territorial	  Hinal	  solution	  was	  ultimately	  sought	  that	  would	  entail	  resettling	  Jews	  in	  another	  region.	  With	  the	  conquest	  of	  Western	  Europe	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1940,	  Himmler	  began	   to	   focus	  his	   attention	  on	  how	  all	   Jews	  might	  be	   removed	  from	   the	   growing	   territory	   of	   the	   Third	   Reich. 	   This	   transition	   in	   Jewish	   policy	   from	  28emigration	   to	   a	   permanent	   “territorial	   Hinal	   solution”	  was	   supported	  by	  Ribbentrop,	  who	  ordered	  Franz	  Rademacher,	  head	  of	  the	  Jewish	  desk	  of	  the	  Foreign	  OfHice,	  to	  develop	  a	  plan	  for	   relocating	   the	   approximately	   four	   million	   European	   Jews	   to	   Madagascar	   where	   they	  would	   essentially	   live	   in	   a	   police	   state,	   controlled	   by	   the	   SS. 	   He	   proposed	   that	   Jewish	  29assets	  would	  be	  liquidated	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  resettlement. 	  The	  Madagascar	  Plan	  did	  not	  come	  30
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to	   fruition,	   however.	  While	   France	  was	   defeated	   and	  Ribbentrop	   did	   put	   into	   effect	   anti-­‐Jewish	  measures	  in	  France,	  the	  British	  success	  in	  the	  Battle	  of	  Britain	  and	  in	  the	  U-­‐boat	  war	  prevented	  Germany	  from	  having	  access	  to	  British	  shipping	  lanes	  to	  Madagascar. 	  Another	  31solution	  would	  therefore	  be	  required	  to	  remove	  the	  Jews	  from	  German	  occupied	  Europe.	  	  	  While	  Ribbentrop	  had	  been	  supportive	  of	  various	  anti-­‐Jewish	  measures	  throughout	  his	  time	  in	  the	  Ministry,	  he	  seemed	  to	  distance	  himself	  from	  the	  Jewish	  question	  by	  1941. 	  32This	   coincided	   with	   a	   radical	   shift	   in	   German	   policy	   regarding	   the	   Jews	   from	   one	   of	  expulsion	  to	  extermination. 	  During	  the	  invasion	  of	  Soviet	  occupied	  territory,	  Jewish	  men,	  33women,	   and	   children	   were	   systematically	   executed	   and	   a	   standardized	   method	   of	   mass	  murder	  was	  developed. 	  This	  was	  so	  effectively	  done	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1941,	  over	  600,000	  34Jews	  had	  been	  killed.	  Historian	  Christopher	  Browning	  argues	  that	  the	  atrocities	  committed	  during	  the	  Soviet	  invasion	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  subsequent	  mass	  murders. 	  Late	  in	  August,	  35Adolf	   Eichmann	   informed	   Luther	   that	   a	   “Hinal	   solution”	   was	   in	   the	   planning	   stages,	   and	  Hitler	  subsequently	  ordered	  the	  deportation	  of	  all	   Jews	  who	  still	  remained	  in	  the	  Reich. 	  36By	  October	  1941	  the	  plans	  for	  mass	  extermination	  had	  taken	  shape,	  but	  the	  deportation	  of	  Jews	   to	   secret	  death	  camps	  would	  not	  begin	  until	   the	   following	  spring	  of	  1942.	  This	  was	  because	   the	   system	   by	   which	   to	   deport	   Jews	   had	   yet	   to	   be	   organized,	   and	   the	   death	  factories	  had	  yet	  to	  be	  built.	  	   	  	   The	   Foreign	   OfHice	   was	   closely	   involved	   in	   this	   process.	   Action	   against	   Jews	   in	  occupied	  countries	  could	  not	  be	  taken	  without	   the	   involvement	  of	   the	  Foreign	  OfHice.	  The	  same	   applied	   to	   foreign	   Jews	   living	   in	   Germany	   and	   to	   Jews	   in	   Axis-­‐afHiliated	   or	   neutral	  countries. 	   Although	   	   Ribbentrop	   had	   distanced	   himself	   from	   this	   process	   initially,	   by	  37issuing	  a	  directive	  in	  August	  1941	  stating	  that	  all	  future	  memos	  from	  the	  SS	  and	  Himmler	  should	   be	   forwarded	   directly	   to	   Luther,	   thus	   escaping	   his	   immediate	   attention,	   he	  nonetheless	   failed	  to	  act	  when	  his	  agent	   in	  Serbia	  actively	  asked	  him	  to	   intervene	  to	  save	  8,000	  Serbian	   Jews	   from	  extermination.	  He	  passed	   the	   information	  on	   to	  Luther,	   instead,	  who	  subsequently	  ordered	  Ribbentrop’s	  agent	  to	  support	  the	  execution. 	  He	  also	  refused	  38to	   act	   on	   information	   about	   the	   mass	   slaughter	   of	   Russian	   Jews.	   In	   order	   to	   avoid	  diplomatic	  conHlicts,	  he	  refused	  to	  allow	  the	  deportation	  of	  non-­‐German	  Jews	  who	  lived	  in	  Germany	  but	  allowed	  Luther	  to	  negotiate	  with	  their	  home	  countries	  which	  were	  often	  anti-­‐Semitic.	   The	   net	   effect	   of	   Ribbentrop’s	   failure	   to	   act	   was	   the	   deportation	   of	   Croatian,	  Romanian,	  and	  Slovak	  Jews	  in	  Germany	  to	  concentration	  camps	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1941.  39	  	   In	   January	   1942,	   a	   meeting	   between	   high-­‐ranking	   Nazi	   ofHicials	   was	   arranged	   to	  resolve	  the	  “Jewish	  Question.”	  This	   infamous	  meeting	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  “Wannsee	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Conference,”	  which	  Martin	  Luther	  attended	  as	  the	  representative	  of	  the	  Foreign	  OfHice. 	  It	  40was	  at	  this	  conference	  that	  Nazi	  leaders	  who	  would	  be	  involved	  in	  facilitating	  the	  transport	  of	   Jews	   from	  German	   occupied	   Europe	   to	   extermination	   camps	   in	   Poland	  were	   explicitly	  informed	  of	  the	  Final	  Solution,	  which	  would	  include	  the	  deportation	  of	  11	  million	  European	  Jews	  to	  the	  East	  where	  they	  would	  be	  separated	  by	  sex	  and	  forced	  to	  build	  roads.	  The	  stated	  expectation	  was	  that	  most	  would	  die	  of	  natural	  causes	  as	  a	  result	  of	  harsh	  conditions,	  but	  that	  those	  who	  did	  survive	  would	  need	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  because	  no	  trace	  of	  the	  Jewish	  race	  could	  be	  permitted	  to	  survive	  to	  rebuild. 	  No	  one	  was	  permitted	  to	  dissent	  at	  this	  meeting	  41and	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry	  was	  committed	  to	  the	  organization	  and	  administration	  of	  the	  mass	  deportation	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people.	  	   	  	   Whether	  or	  not	  Ribbentrop	  actually	  knew	  about	  the	  proposed	  exterminations	  at	  this	  point	   is	   unclear.	   The	   “Luther	   Memorandum”	   did	   not	   actually	   make	   any	   reference	   to	  exterminations	   or	   gassings. 	   	   Moreover,	   Ribbentrop	   had	   little	   to	   do	   with	   the	   “Jewish	  42problem”	   at	   that	   time.	   It	   was	   not	   until	   August	   of	   1942	   that	   Ribbentrop	   renewed	   his	  involvement.	   He	   did	   so	   because	   he	   felt	   the	   SS	   was	   acting	   without	   the	   authority	   of	   the	  Ministry	  and	  because	  Luther	  had	  failed	  to	  include	  him	  on	  matters	  pertaining	  to	  Italy,	  as	  he	  had	  been	   instructed.	  Ribbentrop	   then	  had	  Luther	   removed	   from	  his	  position;	  Luther	  had	  ultimately	  betrayed	  him,	  and	  was	  sent	  to	  a	  concentration	  camp	  as	  a	  result. 	  43Hitler	  was	  furious	  when	  a	  number	  of	  deportations	  were	  subsequently	  delayed,	  and,	  thus,	   after	  meeting	  with	  Hitler,	  Ribbentrop	   immediately	   instructed	  Ernst	   von	  Weizsäcker,	  the	   State	   Secretary	   at	   the	   Foreign	   OfHice,	   to	   begin	   evacuating	   all	   Jews	   from	   Europe	   as	  quickly	  as	  possible. 	  He	  further	  ordered	  the	  initiation	  of	  talks	  with	  Denmark,	  Hungary	  and	  44Bulgaria	   about	   the	  deportation	  of	   Jews	   in	   their	   countries.	   Luther’s	  Abteilung	  Deutschland	  had	   ultimately	   been	   disbanded	   after	   Luther’s	   betrayal,	   but	   Ribbentrop	   created	   a	   new	  agency,	   Group	   Inland,	   that	   continued	   to	   organize	   the	   systematic	   exploitation	   and	  deportation	   of	   the	   Jewish	  people. 	   In	   September	  1942,	   for	   example,	   he	   ordered	  German	  45diplomats	  in	  various	  occupied	  states	  to	  facilitate	  the	  deportation	  of	  Jews	  to	  the	  East	  (i.e.,	  to	  the	   death	   camps). 	   In	   addition,	   during	   the	   spring	   and	   summer	   of	   1944	   the	   Foreign	  46Ministry,	  under	  the	  direct	  authority	  of	  Ribbentrop,	  actively	  participated	  in	  the	  deportation	  of	  437,000	  Hungarian	  Jews	  who	  were	  sent	  to	  Auschwitz,	  320,000	  of	  whom	  were	  murdered	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on	  arrival.  47	  	   Ribbentrop’s	   direct	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Final	   Solution	   is	   made	   apparent	   when	   the	  Regent	  of	  Hungary,	  Miklos	  Horthy,	  asked	  Ribbentrop	  what	  he	  was	  supposed	  to	  do	  with	  all	  the	   Jews	   in	   Hungary,	   and	   he	   is	   said	   to	   have	   replied	   “annihilate	   them	   or	   put	   them	   in	  concentration	  camps…there	  is	  no	  other	  way.” 	  These	  actions	  of	  Ribbentrop’s	  demonstrate	  48his	   commitment	   to	   the	  Nazi	   Final	   Solution	   even	   after	   Luther’s	   removal	   from	   the	   Foreign	  Ministry.	    	   Ribbentrop	  was	  ultimately	  sentenced	  to	  death	  by	  hanging	  on	  1	  October	  1946. 	  His	  49efforts	  to	  convince	  the	  Tribunal	  that	  he	  was	  merely	  a	  loyal	  subordinate	  of	  Hitler,	  who	  simply	  followed	  his	   superiors’	  orders	  and	  made	  no	   important	  decisions,	  had	   failed.	  History	  does	  not	  support	  his	  denial	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  Holocaust.	  Research	  clearly	  demonstrates	  that	  Ribbentrop	  was	   actively	   involved	   in	   the	  persecution	  of	   the	   Jewish	  people	   throughout	   the	  Second	  World	  War.	  By	   facilitating	   the	  Nazi	   rise	   to	  power	  and	   conspiring	   to	  wage	  wars	  of	  aggression,	  Ribbentrop	  played	  a	  signiHicant	  role	  in	  creating	  the	  perfect	  context	  in	  which	  to	  carry	   out	   the	   mass	   genocide	   of	   the	   Jewish	   people.	   Furthermore,	   in	   his	   role	   as	   Foreign	  Minister	   of	   Germany	   from	   1938-­‐45	   he	   directly	   participated	   in	   the	   planning	   and	  administration	   of	   the	   Nazi	   Final	   Solution.	   He	   actively	   endorsed	   an	   anti-­‐Semitic	   policy	  abroad,	  and	  worked	  hard	   to	  expedite	   the	  deportation	  of	   Jews	   throughout	  Europe.	  Among	  many	   other	   horriHic	   acts,	   Ribbentrop	   was	   directly	   involved	   in	   the	   mass	   deportation	   of	  Hungarian	   Jews	  to	  Auschwitz,	  which	  resulted	   in	   the	   loss	  of	  over	  300,000	   lives.	  He	  denied	  personal	  knowledge	  of	  Hitler’s	  ultimate	  plan,	  but	  the	  research	  proves	  otherwise.	  Ultimately,	  Ribbentrop	  was	  guilty	  as	  charged.	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